tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-55565293790054615742024-03-05T22:42:05.873-03:00Seminários GLTA-CLE e Colloquia LogicaeRealizados em conjunto pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia do IFCH e pelo Grupo de Lógica Teórica e Aplicada (GLTA), os Seminários de Lógica (Seminários de Programa e Colloquia Logicae) ocorrem usualmente às quartas-feiras, desenvolvendo intensa programação sobre o tema.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12440305364699839417noreply@blogger.comBlogger94125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-15036938043762469142015-08-06T10:18:00.000-03:002015-08-06T10:24:08.290-03:00Novo blog dos Semináros de Lógica!<h1 class="entry-title" style="display: block;">
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Nosso blog mudou de endereço!</h3>
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O antigo permanecerá no ar como registro dos últimos anos.</div>
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Agradecemos a todos que ajudaram na organização nestes anos.</div>
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<a href="http://www.seminarioscle.wordpress.com/" rel="nofollow">http://www.seminarioscle.wordpress.com</a></h3>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12440305364699839417noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-2067698336420684082015-06-01T11:29:00.000-03:002015-06-01T11:29:19.528-03:0003/06 - Pedro Carrasqueira<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: center;">
<b>On the foundations of a theory of deliberative reason: A logical survey
of the general principles of the theory of rational choices and coherent
preferences</b></div>
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Last century witnessed a great development of the
mathematical foundations of social sciences, due to the rapid growth of
research in decision theory, game theory and social choice theory and to
the astounding results obtained in those fields. Such studies seem to
me to point towards a more general theory of rationality in practical
contexts, and, in particular, to a mathematical theory of deliberative
reason. Such a possibility, however, presupposes a (to the best of my knowledge) not yet systematically undertaken philosophical inquiry of
the principles underlying those theories, --- one that would explore
their pertinence to settings broader than those proper to the social
sciences.</div>
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My exposition shall be divided in three parts.</div>
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In the first part I shall present the main concepts common to all those theories --- to wit, the notions of <i>choice</i>, <i>preference</i>, <i>welfare</i><wbr></wbr>, <i>n</i><i>orm</i> and <i>strategy</i> ---
and discuss in very broad strokes how they relate, with special
attention to the relation between the more fundamental concepts of
choice and preference. (I say they are more fundamental because they
seem to me to be the ones that characterize, minimally, a deliberative
setting.)</div>
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In the second part I shall briefly discuss what
contributions (beyond the already well-known use of games in model
theory) I believe such an enlargement of the field of application of
those concepts would have to offer to logic in general, and to logic in
practical contexts in particular.</div>
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In the third part I shall present a few questions about how
already well-established logic, and modal logic in particular, could
contribute to the understanding of those fundamental concepts of
deliberative reason. I shall also present, if time allows it, some still
very sketchy proposals of mine towards such a contribution.</div>
<span class="im HOEnZb adL">
</span>Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-21001413054547801362015-05-13T19:17:00.001-03:002015-05-18T20:58:10.848-03:00Colloquium Logicae: Prof. Stefano Predelli<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Meaning Without Truth</b></div>
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Stefano Predelli (da Universidade de Nottingham) apresentará as principais ideias e resultados de seu recente livro "Meaning Without Truth" (Oxford UP 2013). Trata-se de uma interessante tentativa de tratar de forma rigorosa e sistemática aspectos do significado que não são capturáveis na semântica verifuncional (estendendo de algumas formas relevantes a semântica de Kaplan em termos de caráter e conteúdo). Teremos também como comentadora Eleonora Orlando (da Universidad de Buenos Aires).</div>
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<i><b>Três sessões. Sala Kurt Gödel, CLE-UNICAMP.</b></i></div>
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<i>25 de maio (segunda-feira), 16h:</i> Meaning Without Truth I</div>
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<i>27 de maio (quarta-feira), 16h:</i> Meaning Without Truth II</div>
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<i>3 de junho (quarta-feira), 14h:</i> Meaning Without Truth III</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-61072062978731409892015-05-09T13:48:00.000-03:002015-05-09T13:50:00.674-03:0006/05 - Marco Ruffino<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="color: black;"><span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0);">A Puzzle About Frege’s Singular Senses</span></span></b></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0);"><span style="color: black;"><span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0);">In this paper I discuss what seems to be a puzzle for Frege’s notion of singular senses (i.e., the senses of singular terms) assuming the interpretation that, for him, every singular term is reducible to (or express the same sense as) some definite description. Singular senses are supposed to be complete (or saturated), but they are composed of the incomplete (unsaturated) senses of the concept-words of the descriptions. I ask how the definite article (or what it expresses) “transforms” an unsaturated sense into a saturated one, and review some attempted explanations in the literature. I argue that none of them is compatible with Frege’s broader views in semantics. Next I discuss one alternative that Frege himself endorses (the definite article indicating an attitude on the speaker’s part). This alternative, I argue, is also incompatible with his semantics. I conclude that Frege has no coherent view on singular senses.</span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0);"><span style="color: black;"><span style="background-color: rgba(255,255,255,0);"><i>*DF-IFCH and CLE-UNICAMP</i> </span></span></span></span></div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-42310818379787658452015-04-14T13:09:00.003-03:002015-04-14T13:10:34.451-03:00Colloquium Logicae: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Lenzen<div style="text-align: justify;">
<b>"Leibniz Logic"</b> on Wednesday April 15th, 16:30, Gödel Room at CLE- UNICAMP<br />
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<b>
"A Survey on Epistemic Logic"</b> on Thursday 16th, 14:00, Gödel Room at CLE- UNICAMP</div>
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<b><i>Biography and eulogy: Prof. Wolfgang Lenzen (in German)</i></b></div>
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http://www.lumer.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/C005_LumerMeyer_VorwortFSLenzen.pdf</div>
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<i>Department of Philosophy, Universität Osnabrück, Germany</i></div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-87346515492165402672015-03-24T07:52:00.003-03:002015-03-24T07:52:28.306-03:0025/03 - Lucas Rosenblatt (Colloquium Logicae)<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Capturing Naive Validity in the Strict-Tolerant Approach</b></div>
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Rejecting the structural rule of Cut has been recently proposed as a
strategy to avoid both the usual semantic paradoxes and the so-called
Validity Paradox. In this paper we consider if a theory that rejects Cut
is capable of accurately representing its own notion of validity. We
claim that the standard rules governing a naive validity predicate are
too weak for this purpose and we show that although it is possible to
strengthen these rules, the most obvious way of doing so brings with it a
serious problem: an internalized version of Cut can be proved. We also
evaluate a number of possible ways of escaping this difficulty. </div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-49921304553146270192015-03-03T15:00:00.003-03:002015-03-03T15:00:47.688-03:0011/03 - Emiliano Boccardi<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>If it ain’t Moving it shall not be Moved: real passage for A-theorists</b> </div>
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Imagine two friends sitting on a beach, looking at a ship far away. Because of the distance, they cannot just tell by looking at it whether the ship is moving or not. “I bet it’s moving” says one. “No it’s not!”, says the other. Do they disagree about something? And if yes, what is the disagreement exactly about?</div>
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After some time the two friends look again and the ship has obviously moved, although it looks to them just as still as it looked before: its position (relative to them) has changed. “Aha!”, says the first, “I told you it was moving!” “You were right, it was moving. I lost the bet!”, says the other. What was this bet about?</div>
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Physics and mathematics textbooks follow Bertrand Russell in accounting for a body‘s instantaneous velocity not merely as equal to, but moreover as identical to the time-derivative of its trajectory. On this view, a body’s instantaneous velocity is ontologically parasitic on its trajectory. This deflationist understanding of change was heavily inspired by Weierstrass’ and Cantor’s understanding of limit and infinity. According to Weierstrass’ conception of limits and infinitesimals (now the received view), variables are just denotational schemas: they contribute to the sole purpose of denoting large numbers of (unchanging) facts about their values. The values of the variables do not themselves vary: they do not “approach”, let alone “reach” their limits, or change in any sense, contrary to what they were ambiguously alleged to be doing in prior formulations (since Newton’s and Leibniz’s). Of course, according to this conception, neither do variables themselves vary or change, in spite of their evocative name. It was this reconceptualization of the notion of limit that inspired Russell’s treatment of the antinomies involved in the notion of indefinitely growing series of things (such as those involved in Zeno’s paradoxes): “Weierstrass”, he says, “by strictly banishing all infinitesimals has at last shown that we live in an unchanging world, and that [Zeno’s] arrow, at every moment of its flight, is truly at rest” (POM, p. 347).</div>
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Likewise, many philosophers of time argue that the passage of time is identical with the fact that different times subsequently instantiate presentness.</div>
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However, I shall argue in the first part of this talk, it is tempting to think that the initial disagreement between the two friends is about a property instantiated by the ship at (and only at) the time of the bet (t1). What they observe at the time of the assessment of the bet (t2), according to this intuitive view, is the comparative fact that the ship’s location at t1 is different from its location at t2. They agree that this provides indirect evidence for the further (non-comparative) fact that the ship was moving at t1. If the ship is found at different positions at times right after t1, this must be because at t1 it possessed an intrinsic kinematic quantity in addition to its position.</div>
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If this explanatory pattern is sound, then the comparative fact that (a) the location of the ship at t1 is different from its location at t2, must be ontologically distinct from the (non-comparative) fact that (b) the object has been in motion for enough times between t1 and t2. In short, according to this view, the displacement of the ship is a posthumous consequence of its state of motion (velocity) throughout the time interval considered, hence fact b (the explanans) cannot be identical to fact a (the explanandum). Analogously, I shall defend the thesis that yesterday became past because time passes. The passage of time ought to explain the ensuing comparative fact that Today’s presentness followed Yesterday’s presentness, so it cannot be thought of as identical with it. The ensuing view construes passage as an intrinsic, non-comparative feature of time instants.</div>
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In the second, more tentative part of the talk, I shall bring this issue to bear on the formal semantics of axiomatic treatments of aspect. In particular, I shall consider different solutions to the so called Imperfective Paradox, and test them against the desiderata put forward in the first part of the talk.</div>
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<i>References</i><br /><br />Arntzenius, F. (2000) Are there really instantaneous velocities? Monist 83:187–208</div>
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Bach, E. (1986) The algebra of events, Linguistics and Philosophy, 9(1):5–16</div>
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Bigelow, J. (1991) Worlds enough for time. Nouˆs 25:1–19 . Bigelow J, Pargetter R (1990) Science and necessity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge</div>
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Boccardi, E. (2015) If it ain't Moving it shall not be Moved, Topoi, 34(1): 171-185</div>
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Dowty, D. (1979) Word Meaning and Montague Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel</div>
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Hall, N. (2004) Two concepts of causation. In: Collins, Hall N, Paul, LA (eds)</div>
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Causation and counterfactuals. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 225–276</div>
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James, W. (1987) Writings 1902–1910. Literary Classics of the United States inc., New York</div>
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Lange, M. (2005) How can instantaneous velocity fulfill its causal role? Philos Rev 114(4): 433–468 <br /><br />Le Poidevin, R. (2002) Zeno’s arrow and the significance of the present. In: Callender</div>
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Craig, University Cambridge (eds) Time, reality and experience. Press, Cambridge</div>
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Parsons, T., 1989, “The progressive in English: Events, states and processes”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 12(2): 213–241</div>
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–––, 1990, Events in the Semantics of English, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.</div>
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Prior, A., 1967, Past, Present, and Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</div>
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Russell, B. (1938) Principles of mathematics. W.W. Norton & Company, inc, New York </div>
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Tooley, M. (1988) In defense of the existence of states of motion. Philos Top 16:225–254</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-21725761629910110102014-12-02T17:11:00.003-02:002014-12-02T17:56:52.660-02:0003/12 - Rodolfo Ertola<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Adding connectives to non-classical logics</b></div>
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Already in 1919 Skolem studied, from an algebraic point of view, certain operations that appear afterwards from a logical point of view, for example in 1942 in a work by Moisil. This is done in the context of a logic that, more recently, has been called bi-intuitionistic. Some decades afterwards, there also appear many papers by the polish logician Rauszer on the same logic. More recently, in 2009, Priest gave a paraconsistent version of some kind of bi-intuitionistic logic. We have proved that, in fact, using a notion by Urbas, it is strictly paraconsistent. Approximately in the same tradition appears the connective ∆ of fuzzy logic. We have proved that, added to a Heyting algebra, the result is an equational class.</div>
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Another tradition was started in Russia by Novikov in the Fifties and corresponds to the notion of intuitionistic connective. These connectives are supposed to give conservative expansions and enjoy the Disjunction Property. Regarding this, we consider some problems that arise in the case of first-order intuitionistic logic for connectives suggested by Smetanich, Kuznetsov, Gabbay, and Humberstone.</div>
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Axioms may not be enough for the axiomatization, i.e. in some cases it is necessary to add a rule. From a semantical point of view, the choice is between a truth-preserving or a truth-degree-preserving consequence.</div>
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<i>Unicamp - Brazil</i></div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-61117828628745679572014-11-17T18:33:00.004-02:002014-11-17T18:33:45.814-02:0019/11 - Esko Turunen, PhD*<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>A Paraconsistent Version of Pavelka's Fuzzy Logic</b></div>
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In 1979 Jan Pavelka introduced a very general framework
to deal with many valued logics. Pavelka's idea was to process Zadeh's
Fuzzy Sets such that theories, rules of inference, proofs as well as tautologies may be only partial, i.e. fuzzy. Pavelka
defined all his concepts in complete residuated lattices. The main issue
was to study the circumstances under which the fuzzy semantic consequence operation and fuzzy syntactic operation coincide; such a
property is called Pavelka style completeness. Pavelka solved the
problem in the special case that the set of truth values is the Lukasiewicz sturucure, i.e. the real unit interval equipped
with standard MV-structure. The present author has recently proved that
Pavelka style completeness holds if, and only if the set of truth values is a complete MV-algebra. Thus, if in particular ,the
set M of truth values is a certain collection of 2x2-matrices equipped
with suitable operations, then M is a complete MV-algebra. In fact, the set M extends Belnap's four valued para consistent logic. Such
an approach results a complete many-valued logic that behaves
consistently when looking from outside: the structure in related to Lukasiewicz logic which is a consistent logic. However, looking the
logic from inside, i.e. a single 2x2-matrix, para consistency steps in.
Truth and falsehood are not opposites of each other, and also contradictions and lack of knowledge is involved.</div>
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<i>*Tampere University of Technology (Tampere, Finland)</i>Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-40719726073901619392014-11-10T08:13:00.003-02:002014-11-10T08:13:22.035-02:0012/11 - Francesc Esteva* & Lluis Godo*<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>On paraconsistent fuzzy logics</b></div>
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Paraconsistent
logics are specially tailored to deal with inconsistency, while fuzzy
logics primarily deal with graded truth and vagueness. Aiming at
studying logics that can handle inconsistency and graded truth at once,
this talk will report about recent investigations on how a notion of
paraconsistent fuzzy logic can be cast within the framework of the
so-called logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs).</div>
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As
in classical logic, it is clear that the notion of truth-preserving
deduction commonly used in systems of mathematical fuzzy logic is
incompatible with any form of paraconsistency. However, in the first
part of the seminar we will show that, instead, some degree-preserving
fuzzy logics exhibit interesting paraconsistency features. We will also
consider expansions of these logics with additional negation connectives
and study their paraconsistency properties as LFIs.</div>
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In
the second part of the seminar, we will address a kind of converse
problem, namely how to extend a given fuzzy logic with a new
“consistency” operator in the style of the LFIs. We will introduce a set
of postulates for this type of operators over the corresponding
algebras, leading to the definition and axiomatization of a family of
logics, expansions of MTL, whose degree-preserving counterpart are
paraconsistent and moreover LFIs.</div>
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</div>
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In the
third and final part of the seminar, we will talk about some remarks on ongoing work on the study on intermediate paraconsistent fuzzy logics
between the truth-preserving and degree-preserving logics.</div>
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*IIIA - CSIC, Barcelona, Spain</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-20325033143293861302014-11-03T18:21:00.002-02:002014-11-03T18:23:04.970-02:0005/11 - Gabriele Pulcini<div title="Page 1">
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<b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">A Uniform
Setting for Classical,
Non-Monotonic and Paraconsistent Logic</span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In this talk, we propose a
uniform syntactical framework encompassing classical, non monotonic and paraconsistent logic. Such a uniform framework is
obtained by means of the control sets logical device. Control sets leave the underlying syntax unchanged, while affecting the
very combinatorial structure of sequents and proofs.
Moreover, we prove the cut-elimination theorem for a version of controlled
propositional
classical logic, i.e. the sequent calculus for classical propositional logic to
which a control sets system is applied. Our goals are two-folds: i) to overcome the conceptual gap
between
classical and non-classical logics; ii) to give, in
particular, a new (positive) account of paraconsistency (and
non-monotonicity) in terms of concurrency</span></span><span style="font-family: 'CMR8'; font-size: 8.000000pt;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span></span><br />
</span></div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-37105279593812444332014-10-21T11:01:00.003-02:002014-10-21T11:02:50.956-02:0022/10 - Rodrigo Freire<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Funções de primeira ordem, Parte 2</b><br />
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
Esta apresentação é dedicada às funções de primeira ordem, que são uma
generalização das funções de verdade. Os conceitos de tabela de verdade e
de sistema de funções de verdade, ambos introduzidos na
lógica proposicional por Emil Post, são também generalizados e
estudados no caso quantificacional. O tema central desta exposição é a
relação de definição entre noções expressas por fórmulas da lógica de
primeira ordem. Enfatizamos que a lógica não se ocupa apenas da
relação de consequência entre noções expressas por fórmulas, em que
uma noção é consequência de outras. A lógica também se ocupa da relação
de definição entre noções, em que uma noção é definida a
partir de outras. Em uma segunda parte, vamos analisar a relação de
definição entre noções expressas por fórmulas da lógica de primeira
ordem. Nós vemos a lógica de primeira ordem como uma estrutura
matemática cujo domínio é o sistema de todas as funções e primeira
ordem, munida das operações básicas e da relação de consequência entre
funções de primeira ordem. Em particular, os domínios de subestruturas
da lógica de primeira ordem são os sistemas de funções de primeira
ordem.</div>
</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-29338471536052629792014-09-30T14:43:00.000-03:002014-09-30T14:43:32.872-03:0001/10 - Rodrigo Freire<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Funções de primeira ordem, Parte 1</b></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Esta apresentação é dedicada às funções de primeira ordem, que são uma generalização das funções de verdade. Os conceitos de tabela de verdade e de sistema de funções de verdade, ambos introduzidos na
lógica proposicional por Emil Post, são também generalizados e
estudados no caso quantificacional. O tema central desta exposição é a
relação de definição entre noções expressas por fórmulas da lógica de
primeira ordem. Enfatizamos que a lógica não se ocupa apenas da
relação de consequência entre noções expressas por fórmulas, em que
uma noção é consequência de outras. A lógica também se ocupa da relação de definição entre noções, em que uma noção é definida a
partir de outras. Em uma segunda parte, vamos analisar a relação de
definição entre noções expressas por fórmulas da lógica de primeira
ordem. Nós vemos a lógica de primeira ordem como uma estrutura
matemática cujo domínio é o sistema de todas as funções e primeira
ordem, munida das operações básicas e da relação de consequência entre
funções de primeira ordem. Em particular, os domínios de subestruturas
da lógica de primeira ordem são os sistemas de funções de primeira
ordem.</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-70088275226118120102014-09-22T18:42:00.003-03:002014-09-22T18:42:40.095-03:0024/09 - Mathieu Beirlaen*<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Inconsistency-adaptive dialogical logic, or how to dialogue sensibly in the presence of inconsistencies</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Even when inconsistencies are present, we can sensibly distinguish between good and bad arguments relying on these premises. Not anything goes: the mere presence of inconsistencies does not warrant the inference to any conclusion whatsoever. In order to separate good and bad inferences in the possible presence of inconsistency, we nowadays have a wide range of paraconsistent logics to our disposal.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Many of these logics, however, lack the inferential power and the dynamics to model how we actually treat information tainted by inconsistency. An exception in this respect is Batens’ inconsistency-adaptive approach, in which all rules of classical logic are applicable to those parts of our premise set which we can safely consider untainted by inconsistency, without having to specify beforehand which parts of our premises behave consistently.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In order to bring this dynamic approach to paraconsistency closer to our actual argumentative practice, we use its machinery to extend the paraconsistent approach to dialogical logic as developed by Rahman and Carnielli. This way, we obtain a very powerful formalism for the systematic study of dialogues in which two parties exchange arguments over a central claim, in the possible presence of inconsistent information.</div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i>* Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (IIF) - Universidad National Autonoma de México (UNAM)</i></div>
<i>Joint work with Matthieu Fontaine (IIF-UNAM)</i>Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-704585730761739172014-09-08T10:59:00.002-03:002014-09-08T10:59:57.369-03:00Raymundo Morado's Talks at GTAL-CLE Seminars<div style="text-align: justify;">
In 1800, Kant famously declared exhausted our research into logic. According to him, “we do not require any new discoveries in Logic” (“wir brauchen auch zur Logik keine neuen Erfindungen”). Mankind had found practically all there was to find about inference and validity. Turned out the news of the end of logic were greatly exaggerated. So, are there any limits to logic? Certainly, we do
very little syllogistic logic anymore, and we expect no big surprises from classical propositional calculus. Maybe logic ended
in 1879, with the publication of the first complete system of first-order quantificational logic; maybe in 1932 with the normal systems of strict implication. Yet, logic keeps expanding both its depth and its breadth. We have discovered truths about the logical connectives that intrigued the stoics, and we have expanded the
power of classical logic with amazing conservative extensions. Still, some developments seem to challenge our very notion of
logicality. Kant was talking from a certain perspective of what logic is that excluded from the set go many recent developments. If
logic is the science of necessary inference, non-deductive forms of
reasoning must fall outside its realm; mathematical induction is in,
induction in zoology is out. If logic is the science of abstract
concepts, there can be a logical theory of classical quantifiers,
but not of all fallacies. Each idea of logic sets its limits. Limits
can be good, as Kant’s dove attests. But there can be also good reasons to evolve our concepts out of the old limits and to allow
them to encompass new or unsuspected facets of reality.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i><b>September 10</b></i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
I
propose to see if we can find a principled extension of our ideas of
logic when confronted with non-classical systems, especially with
rival logics. I believe there are important lessons for the philosophy of logic to be gleaned from the examination of logics
such as the intuitionistic, free, or quantum ones.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i><b>September 17</b></i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
I will illustrate this with the case of the paraconsistent logics of relevance which are of great importance both theoretical and practical.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i><b>October 8</b></i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Then we shall examine some of the general problems of constraining excessively our notion of logicality and illustrate this with a discussion of the family of non-monotonic formalisms. This will lead us to consider some formal questions that can help us hone pertinent concepts.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i><b>October 15</b></i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
And this in turn will be useful to tackle the ultimate limit: the general issue of what justifies
logic itself. We shall finally mention some open problems in
this area of the philosophy of logic(s). These are mostly fundamental topics, and we shall only require the minimal symbolic apparatus of a first semester in logic.</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-39489043784470584112014-05-25T23:46:00.001-03:002014-05-25T23:55:08.697-03:0028/05 - Tony Marmo<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: #666666;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Comparison of Logics: Some Issues and
Perspectives</b></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: #666666;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #666666;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-GB">Throughout the recent history of logic,
many logic systems have been proposed in accordance with their proponents’
philosophical standpoints. Additionally, the comparative endeavours require
that one firstly defines the sense in which one system contains the other
(specially when logics of different valences are at stake). In this talk we
shall present some comparative methods available in the literature and,
inasmuch as possible, some pertinent issues. We shall briefly try to show how
philosophical arguments/objections reflect in different results, perhaps
yielding unexpected results.</span></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #666666;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #666666;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-GB">One of such issues will be Suszko’s
claim against many-valuedness and his reduction method. Time permitting; we
shall try to present Gehrke and Walker theorem, a proven result that goes in
the opposite direction of Suszko’s arguments.</span></span></span></span></div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-10798382180301806822014-05-11T22:51:00.002-03:002014-05-11T22:51:43.261-03:0014/05 - Peter Verdée<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>(Paraconsistent) adaptive logics: a logico-philosophical introduction</b></div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In this talk I will introduce adaptive logics as models for rational
defeasible reasoning. First I will explain what defeasible reasoning is
and why is useful to distinguish rational from irrational defeasible
reasoning patterns. I will illustrate that there exist very different
forms of defeasible reasoning (induction, abduction, vagueness,
inconsistency handling, belief merging, etc.) but that they nevertheless
have some formal aspects in common.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Next, I will introduce the Standard Format of Adaptive Logic (SF). I
will give a short introduction to the semantics and proof theory of (SF)
and will give some examples of adaptive logics within the format of the
SF, with special attention for paraconsistent adaptive logics. I will
argue why adaptive logics defined within SF are good unifying
formalisations of many aspects of defeasible reasoning.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Finally, I will discuss some issues concerning the (computational) complexity of adaptive logics.</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-74685656751884611372014-04-22T19:04:00.001-03:002014-04-22T19:04:58.493-03:0030/04 - Rafael Testa<h3 style="-qt-block-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; text-indent: 0px;">
<b>A system of Belief Revision based on the formal consistency operator</b></h3>
<div style="-qt-block-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; text-indent: 0px;">
<br /></div>
<div style="-qt-block-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; text-indent: 0px;">
<!--StartFragment-->The <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-belief-revision/" target="_blank">Belief Revision</a> studies how rational agents change their beliefs when they receive new information. The AGM system, most influential work in this area of study presented by Alchourrón, Gärdenfos and Makinson, postulates rationality criteria for different types of belief change and provides explicit constructions for such -- the equivalence between the postulates and operations is called the representation theroem. Recent studies show how the AGM paradigm can be compliant with different non-classical logics, which is called the AGM-compliance -- this is the case of the paraconsistent logics family that we analyzed, the <a href="http://www.cle.unicamp.br/e-prints/vol_5,n_1,2005.html" target="_blank">Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). </a></div>
<div style="-qt-block-indent: 0; -qt-paragraph-type: empty; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; text-indent: 0px;">
<br /></div>
<br />
Despite the AGM-compliance, when we consider a new logic its underlying rationality must be understood and its language should be used in fact. In this work, we redefine the AGM operations and propose new constructions, which actually captures the intuition of LFIs -- this is what we call the<br />
AGM<span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: PT-BR; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS 明朝"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">° </span><!--EndFragment-->system. Thus we provide an interesting interpretation for these logics, more in line with formal epistemology. In an alternative approach, by considering the AGM-compatibility, the AGM results can be directly applied to LFIs (<a href="http://seminarioscle.blogspot.com.br/2013/10/3010-rafael-testa.html" target="_blank">as we presented in the previous seminar</a>). In both approaches, we prove the corresponding theorems of representation where needed.<!--EndFragment--><br />
<br />
<br />
This is part of my doctoral thesis supervised by Professor Dr. Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (Unicamp) and by Professor Dr. Márcio Moretto Ribeiro (USP).Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12440305364699839417noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-21372744865746435532014-03-27T11:40:00.000-03:002014-03-27T11:40:34.981-03:0002/04 - Olivier Rioul<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>A mathematical analysis of Fitts' law</b></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Fitts' law is a well-known empirical regularity which predicts the average movement time T it takes people, under time pressure, to reach
a target of width W located at distance D with some pointer. This model has proven useful in several fields of applied psychology such as Human-Computer Interaction and Ergonomics. Whether Fitts' law is a logarithmic law or a power law has remained unclear so far: In two widely cited papers, Meyer & al. have claimed that the power model
they derived from their celebrated stochastic optimized sub-movement
theory encompasses the logarithmic model as a limiting case, when the number of submovements grows large. We review the Meyer & al. sub-movement theory and show that this claim is questionable
mathematically. Our analysis reveals that the traditional theory
implies in fact a quasi-logarithmic, rather than quasi-power model, the two models not being equivalent. Incidentally, the original logarithmic model was derived by Fitts (1954) in analogy with
Shannon's information capacity formula (1948); we conclude this talk by discussing recent advances on a sub-movement model that justifies the information theoretic approach. At any rate, awareness that the two classes of candidate mathematical descriptions of Fitts' law are
not equivalent should stimulate experimental research in the field.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Joint work with Yves Guiard (CNRS LTCI, France). This work was
presented at the 2012 Meeting of the European Mathematical Psychology
Group (see also [1], [2]).</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i>Bio</i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Olivier Rioul (PhD, HDR) is professor at Telecom ParisTech and Ecole Polytechnique, France. His research interests [3] are in applied
mathematics and include various, sometimes unconventional,
applications of information theory such as in Bayesian dynamic
estimation, hardware security, and experimental psychology. He has
been teaching information theory at various French universities for
almost twenty years. He has published a textbook [4] which has become
a classical French reference in the field. A Brazilian edition of the book is scheduled to be published by Editora da Unicamp in the future.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i>References</i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[1] O. Rioul and Y. Guiard, "Power vs. logarithmic model of Fitts'
law: A mathematical analysis," Math. Sci. hum. / Mathematics and
Social Sciences, No. 199, 2012(3), p. 85-96.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[2] O. Rioul and Y. Guiard, "The power model of Fitts' law does not
encompass the logarithmic model," Electronic Notes in Discrete
Mathematics, Elsevier, Vol. 42, June 2013, pp. 65-72.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S1571065313001509" target="_blank">http://authors.elsevier.com/<wbr></wbr>sd/article/S1571065313001509</a></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[3] <a href="http://perso.telecom-paristech.fr/%7Erioul/research.html" target="_blank">http://perso.telecom-<wbr></wbr>paristech.fr/~rioul/research.<wbr></wbr>html</a> </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[4] O. Rioul, Théorie de l'Information et du Codage, Hermes Science, 2007.</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-5476467946918967002014-03-20T00:41:00.000-03:002014-03-20T00:47:50.036-03:0026/03 - Dante Cardoso Pinto de Almeida<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Trebuchet,Verdana,sans-serif; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">Dedução Natural Rotulada para Lógicas Modais e Multimodais</span></b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Trebuchet,Verdana,sans-serif; font-size: small; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Dedução
Natural é um sistema de prova desenvolvido independentemente por
Gentzen e Jaśkowski. Caracteriza-se por conter diversas regras de
inferência, em geral duas para cada
operador (uma para introduzi-lo e outra para eliminá-lo) em contraste
com a presença de pouquíssimos ou nenhum axioma; além do mais,
caracteriza-se por conter regras de inferência hipotéticas. Assim, o
sistema de Dedução Natural passou a ser reconhecido como o que mais se
aproxima da forma como se raciocina em matemática.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Trebuchet,Verdana,sans-serif; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;">Contudo,
a despeito deste sistema de prova ser aplicado com sucesso a diversos
sistemas de lógica (ex: clássica, intuicionista, minimal, algumas
lógicas relevantes, alguns poucos sistemas modais etc), tem-se
encontrado diversas dificuldades para aplicá-lo em diversos outros
sistemas. Recentemente estas dificuldades vem sendo contornadas por
autores como Simpson e Gabbay, com a adoção
de sistemas de provas rotulados. Rótulos (ou etiquetas) são marcações
atribuídas às formulas em um sistema de provas, geralmente expressando
propriedades semânticas dessas.</span><br />
<br /></div>
<div style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Trebuchet,Verdana,sans-serif; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div style="color: #666666; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Trebuchet,Verdana,sans-serif; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;">Neste
seminário, mostrarei como a dedução natural rotulada funciona para
diversos sistemas de lógica modal e multimodal, discutirei o que ainda
há para ser estudado na área e como esse sistema pode ser utilizado para
formalizar raciocínios e argumentos envolvendo termos modais.</span></div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-82597709712440285582014-03-10T17:46:00.000-03:002014-03-10T17:49:58.382-03:0012/03 - Rodolfo C. Ertola Biraben<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Modal aspects in bi-intuitionistic logic</b></div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In the context of a Heyting algebra extended with the dual ─ of the relative pseudocomplement →, we study ¬<i>D</i> and <i>D</i>¬, where ¬ stands for usual intuitionistic negation and <i>D</i> stands for co-negation. Operation <i>D</i> may be defined, for any <i>x</i>, as (<i>x</i> → <i>x</i>) ─ <i>x</i>. Operations ¬<i>D</i> and <i>D</i>¬ behave very much like necessity and possibility, respectively. The result has all the modal properties of modal system B. We prove facts considering [3].</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In 1942 Moisil considered <i>DD</i> and ¬¬ for necessity and possibility, respectively (see [2]). Now, for <i>DD</i> modal axiom K is not available.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
We consider the extension with the corresponding S4 axiom and prove that it is conservative. In both cases we study the modalities.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
We also compare the given framework with the extension with the connective Δ in Fuzzy Logic (see e.g. [1]).</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
We mostly present our results from the algebraic point of view. However, we also include some logic considerations. Adding axioms to intuitionistic logic is not enough, i.e. it is necessary to add a rule. Also, two different logics appear, depending, from a semantical point of view, on whether a truth-preserving or a truth-degree-preserving consequence is chosen.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<i>References</i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[1] Hajek, P. (1998), <i>Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic</i>, Kluwer.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[2] Moisil, G. C. (1972), <i>Essai sur les logiques non chrysippiennes</i>, Éditions de l'academie de la république socialiste de Roumanie.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
[3] Simpson, A. K. (1994), The proof theory and semantics of intuitionistic modal logic, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh.</div>
Sandrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13568657847138271354noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-90985247893807242542013-11-24T22:29:00.005-02:002013-11-24T22:29:55.918-02:0027/11 - Abílio Rodrigues<br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;">Adversus dialetheicus: Sobre uma interpretação intuitiva para as</span></div>
<div style="font-family: inherit; text-align: justify;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;">semânticas de valorações das Lógicas da Inconsistência Formal</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Abílio Rodrigues</span></div>
</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Departamento de Filosofia, UFMG</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">(Trabalho conjunto com Walter Carnielli)</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Para mostrar que uma justificativa filosófica para lógicas </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">paraconsistentes não depende da tese dialeteísta segundo a qual </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">existem contradições verdadeiras é importante apresentar uma </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">interpretação intuitiva e filosoficamente motivada para a aceitação de </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">contradições em uma teoria cuja lógica subjacente seja </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">paraconsistente. Partindo da ideia de que a presença de um par de </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">sentenças A e ~A indica um excesso de informação, que por princípio </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">deveria ser posteriormente eliminado, examinamos em que medida a </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">semântica de valorações para Lógicas da Inconsistência Formal são </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">apropriadas para expressar os significados intuitivos dos operadores </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">de negação e consistência da seguinte forma:</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">v(A) = 1 significa que existe evidência de que A é o caso</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">v(A) = 0 significa que existe evidência de que A não é o caso</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">v(oA) = 1 significa que o valor de verdade de A foi conclusivamente estabelecido</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Veremos que a lógica mbC pode ser modificada de modo a expressar de </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">modo mais adequado a interpretação acima. Em particular, analisaremos </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">a sintaxe e semântica do sistema de lógica sentencial obtido pela </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">retirada da Lei de Dummett A v A -> B de mbC, que chamamos de Lógica </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Básica da Consistência (LBC). BLC modifica o critério proposto por </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Newton da Costa segundo o qual uma lógica paraconsistente deve ter </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">tudo o que pode ser adicionado de modo que explosão e não contradição </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">não possam ser demonstrados. Diferentemente, BLC tem o mínimo </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">necessário para restaurar a lógica clássica para fórmulas</span></div>
</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">consistentes.</span></div>
</span><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #222222;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Apesar de ser mais fiel à interpretação acima do que mbC, alguns </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">problemas permanecem, em especial a falha do teorema da substituição, </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">que produz resultados contraintuitivos. Pretendemos também discutir</span></div>
</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">maneiras de contornar esse problema, como também de que modo BLC </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">poderia ser modificada de modo a melhor expressar a interpretação </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">intuitiva acima apresentada.</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
</span>Anahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17542161982145966763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-83283445190406461272013-11-05T10:54:00.002-02:002013-11-05T10:54:30.185-02:0006/11 - Maria Inés Corbalán<br />
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit;">Déficit de recursos no cálculo <span style="font-style: italic;">resource-conscious</span> de Lambek</span></b></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> A gramática categorial ou gramática de tipos lógicos é uma gramática formal baseada no cálculo lógico proposto por J. Lambek. O cálculo L de Lambek é uma lógica subestrutural vinculada, via o isomorfismo de Curry-Howard, com o λ-cálculo. Em termos de teoria da prova à la Gentzen, o cálculo <span style="font-weight: bold;">L</span> carece de quaisquer regras estruturais. A lógica de Lambek é uma lógica <span style="font-style: italic;">resource-conscious</span>. Em termos do λ-cálculo, <span style="font-weight: bold;">L</span> carece das operações de abstração vazia e de abstração múltipla. </span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Diversos fenômenos linguísticos presentes na linguagem natural em geral e em diferentes línguas particulares propiciaram a extensão do cálculo de Lambek, originando uma ampla variedade de cálculos dedutivos subestruturais.</span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Em particular, extensões de L foram propostas para enfrentar problemas de déficit de recursos. O fenômeno da referência anafórica representa um desafio para uma gramática formal subestrutural que não admita a reutilização de recursos lexicais.</span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> As estruturas gramaticais chamadas de estruturas de controle não representam, em geral, um contexto de aparição do fenômeno de referência anafórica, quando analisadas em termos da gramática categorial e da teoria semântica da propriedade. Pelo fato de o controle ser um fenômeno independente da anáfora, os estudos sobre resolução da anáfora usando a gramática categorial como marco teórico não contribuíram para o estudo das estruturas de controle. E, de modo análogo, os estudos sobre as estruturas de controle no marco da gramática categorial não contribuíram para a questão da reutilização de recursos levantada pelo fenômeno da anáfora e, consequentemente, não propiciaram desenvolvimentos lógicos vinculados com o cálculo <span style="font-weight: bold;">L</span>.</span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> No entanto, atendendo ao fenômeno empírico do controle em português, neste projeto de pesquisa faremos convergir tais âmbitos de estudo ---até hoje--- independentes no marco da gramática categorial: os estudos sobre a anáfora e os estudos sobre as estruturas de controle. Mostraremos que o particular fenômeno do controle no português apresenta um desafio para a lógica de Lambek. Procuraremos superar tal desafio usando as ferramentas lógicas propostas pela gramática categorial no estudo da anáfora, avaliando os argumentos das teorias da propriedade e da proposição confrontados nos estudos semânticos do controle, e analisando as diversas extensões lógicas do cálculo de Lambek e as suas estruturas residuais associadas.</span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Consequentemente, e como resultado de nossa pesquisa, visamos obter contribuições para três contextos distintos: para a lógica ---propondo uma extensão do cálculo <span style="font-weight: bold;">L</span> e, consequentemente, ampliando o escopo empírico da lógica de Lambek; para a semântica filosófica ---estudando as Teorias da Propriedade e da Proposição; e para a linguística ---contribuindo para a discussão sobre o fenômeno do controle a partir do estudo das particulares características que esse fenômeno apresenta no português.</span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="color: #222222;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></div>
<div style="color: #222222; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Palavras-chave: Lógica subestrutural, Isomorfismo Curry-Howard, Gramática Categorial, Estruturas de Controle, Teorias da Propriedade e da Proposição.</span></div>
Anahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17542161982145966763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-56953999140308378842013-10-27T16:04:00.001-02:002013-10-27T16:08:30.236-02:0030/10 - Rafael Testa<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;">Revisão de crenças em lógicas
paraconsistentes:</span></b><br />
<b><span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;">Novas perspectivas à justificativa
coerentista?</span></b><br />
<span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;"><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/rafaeltesta/" target="_blank">Rafael Testa</a></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 36.0pt;">
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;">A revisão de crenças estuda como agentes racionais mudam
suas crenças ao receberem novas informações. O trabalho mais influente desta
área é a teoria apresentada por Alchourrón, Gärdenfos e Makinson. Nesse
trabalho, conhecido como paradigma AGM, foram definidos postulados de
racionalidade para os diferentes tipos de mudança de crenças. Desde então a
área de revisão de crenças foi influenciada e desenvolvida por diversas
disciplinas tais como filosofia, computação e direito.</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: ghostwhite;">Trabalhos recentes mostram
como o paradigma AGM pode ser compatível com algumas lógicas não-clássicas. Neste
seminário veremos como os resultados AGM podem ser aplicados às lógicas
paraconsistentes (pontualmente utilizamos como ponto de partida extensões de
mbC, uma lógica da inconsistência formal). Serão expostos resultados que
garantem a validade dos postulados clássicos a determinadas construções e,
quando este não for o caso, diferentes postulados são propostos. Ao final analisaremos a justificativa coerentista proposta por Gärdenfos para a
racionalidade dos postulados AGM e discutiremos as contribuições da perspectiva
paraconsistente</span> <span style="background-color: ghostwhite;">a estes critérios.</span></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;">Não será esperada
familiaridade com a teria AGM, porém aos interessados em enriquecer a discussão
final sugiro a leitura da entrada da SEP referente ao assunto:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-belief-revision/" target="_blank">http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-belief-revision/</a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; font-family: inherit;">Sobre LFIs:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: ghostwhite; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;"><a href="http://sqig.math.ist.utl.pt/pub/MarcosJ/03-CCM-lfi.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="color: black; font-family: inherit;">http://sqig.math.ist.utl.pt/pub/MarcosJ/03-CCM-lfi.pdf</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 9pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12440305364699839417noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5556529379005461574.post-56603210095573883192013-10-22T21:39:00.004-02:002013-10-22T21:39:54.625-02:0023/10 - Pedro Lemos
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<!--StartFragment--><span style="font-family: inherit;">SEMÂNTICAS BI-TEMPORAIS E A DEFESA ARISTOTÉLICA DA CONTINGÊNCIA DO FUTURO</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">Há uma posição atrativa na literatura de que a defesa aristotélica sobre a contingência do futuro, presente no capítulo IX de </span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-style: italic;">De Interpretatione</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">, se assenta na permissão de lacunas de verdade (</span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-style: italic;">truth-value gaps</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">), alcançada pela quebra do princípio semântico da bivalência, mesmo mantendo a validade irrestrita do princípio lógico do terceiro excluído.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Neste esteio, van Fraassen (1966) e Thomason (1970) apresentaram semânticas com <span style="font-style: italic;">supervalorações</span> que atuam sobre modelos com valorações bivalentes clássicas, permitindo que futuros contingentes apresentem lacunas, o que em tese reflete a intenção inicial de Aristóteles em restringir o princípio de bivalência, mas não o princípio lógico do terceiro excluído, já que nestas semânticas as instâncias do terceiro excluído com futuros contingentes são sempre satisfeitas. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Partindo disto, o seminário terá como intuito explorar três tópicos. Em primeiro lugar, apresentaremos uma semântica de referência bi-temporal, capaz de variar a acessibilidade de acordo com o contexto em que uma sentença sobre o futuro é acessada, de modo que um mesmo contexto de uso é capaz de satisfazer a necessidade e a contingência de uma sentença sobre o futuro. Em segundo lugar, e tendo em tela tal semântica, iremos propor a distinção entre dois níveis semânticos na avaliação de futuros contingentes, o <span style="font-style: italic;">macro-semântico</span> e o <span style="font-style: italic;">micro-semântico</span>. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Por último, iremos sugerir que Aristóteles defende a contingência <span style="font-style: italic;">macro-semântica</span> do futuro, mas não a <span style="font-style: italic;">micro-semântica</span>. Isso explicaria porque Aristóteles defendia a contingência (ou abertura) do futuro, mesmo aceitando tácitamente princípios de cunho determinístico, como o <span style="font-style: italic;">Princípio da Plenitude </span>e da atualização de possiblidades genuínas, que são curiosamente (e perigosamente, para um defensor do Indeterminismo e de Aristóteles) bastante próximos às premissas do mais famoso argumento para o determinismo, o <span style="font-style: italic;">Argumento do Dominador</span> de Diodorus Cronus. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">1 van Fraassen, B. (1966): <span style="font-style: italic;">Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic. </span>Journal of Philosophy, Vol.63, No. 17, pp.481-495.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: small;">2 </span>Thomason, R. (1970): Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps. Theoria, Vol. 36, I. 3, pp.264-281.</span></div>
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