On the foundations of a theory of deliberative reason: A logical survey
of the general principles of the theory of rational choices and coherent
preferences
Last century witnessed a great development of the
mathematical foundations of social sciences, due to the rapid growth of
research in decision theory, game theory and social choice theory and to
the astounding results obtained in those fields. Such studies seem to
me to point towards a more general theory of rationality in practical
contexts, and, in particular, to a mathematical theory of deliberative
reason. Such a possibility, however, presupposes a (to the best of my knowledge) not yet systematically undertaken philosophical inquiry of
the principles underlying those theories, --- one that would explore
their pertinence to settings broader than those proper to the social
sciences.
My exposition shall be divided in three parts.
In the first part I shall present the main concepts common to all those theories --- to wit, the notions of choice, preference, welfare , norm and strategy ---
and discuss in very broad strokes how they relate, with special
attention to the relation between the more fundamental concepts of
choice and preference. (I say they are more fundamental because they
seem to me to be the ones that characterize, minimally, a deliberative
setting.)
In the second part I shall briefly discuss what
contributions (beyond the already well-known use of games in model
theory) I believe such an enlargement of the field of application of
those concepts would have to offer to logic in general, and to logic in
practical contexts in particular.
In the third part I shall present a few questions about how
already well-established logic, and modal logic in particular, could
contribute to the understanding of those fundamental concepts of
deliberative reason. I shall also present, if time allows it, some still
very sketchy proposals of mine towards such a contribution.